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“ 后人类语境与文论研究的未来” 专题编者按
Editors Introduction to the Issue in Focus

20 世纪中后期以来,媒介技术、神经科学和

状况也极大地影响了当代文学和艺术景观,并对

维上,都可以前所未有地被科技所改造和拓展。

日《 文艺理论研究》 在上海召开的“ 后人类语境与

生物科学等的发展,使得人类无论从身体还是思

文论研究形成了重大影响。 2017 年 9 月 23—24

另一方面,随着人工智能和虚拟现实等技术的发

文论研究的未来” 研讨会,吸引了来自美国、澳大

展,则要么使得机器人等人造物越来越趋近于一

利亚、德国等国的相关专家,其中包括“ 后人类”

种准人类的高智能存在,要么在虚拟空间重新塑

思想最重要的开拓者之一 N. Katherine Hayles,与

造着人类主体。 人类的定义也获得了前所未有的

国内的诸多专家共同探讨了“ 后人文主义” “ 人工

界。 “ 后人类主义” 则在充分吸收控制论、结构主

人类’ 思想” 等诸多论题,本专题均来自其时的会

刷新和拓宽, “ 后人 类” 思 潮 开 始 席 卷 西 方 知 识

义、后结构主义、行动者 网络理论等理论资源之

后,结合对当代科技发展动态的观察,开始越来越

智能与文论研究” “ 动物伦理” “ 科幻小说中的‘ 后
议论文。 “ 后人类状况” 并非某种追赶时髦的惊
人之语,它深刻涉及我们今日生活的诸多面向,作

强势地涉入当代西方思想版图,并对人文主义及

为一种理论话语,它也有力地刺激我们反思现有

人文学科的发展提出了巨大的挑战。 这一后人类

的人文学科研究范式。
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Abstract: Posthuman studies have developed in many different directions, which may be charted according to the role they assign

to computational technologies. Arguing that computational media have been highly influential in the spread of posthumanism and
its conceptualizations, this essay illustrates the importance of digital technologies for writing in the contemporary era. Humans and

computational media participate in hybrid interactions through cognitive assemblages, networks through which information,
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Friedrich Kittler has famously argued that the

found in all URLs, read by computers as indicating

shift from handwriting to typewriter inscription

that a locator command follows, thus performing the

the voice it seemed to embody, functioned within the

standardizing formatting codes rather than devices.

( Kittler, Discourse Networks) . We are in the midst

innovation was, we might think of an imaginary

correlated with a massive shift in how writing, and

discourse networks of 1800 and 1900, respectively

of another shift, even more consequential than that

critical move that made the web possible by

For an analogy to highlight how important this
society in which every make of car requires a

Kittler discussed, from the electromechanical in-

different fuel. The usefulness of cars is limited by

to writing produced by computational media. If I

logistical nightmare for drivers, car manufacturers,

scriptions ( e. g. , manual and electric typewriters)

were to imagine a contemporary sequel, say Dis-

course Networks 1900 / 2000, to Kittlers influential

the availability of stations selling the “ right” fuel, a

and fuel producers. Then someone ( historically,

Tim Berners-Lee ) has a terrific idea: rather than

text, it would argue that the issue is now not merely

focus on the cars and allow each manufacturer to

relation to cognitive technologies. As computational

the fuel and then require each manufacturer to make

the role of the voice but the status of humans in

determine its fuel requirements, why not standardize

media increasingly interpenetrate human complex

the vehicles equipment compatible with this fuel.

humans in developed societies such as North

freely without needing to know whether the right

systems, forming what I call cognitive assemblages,
America, Europe, Japan and China are undergoing

complex social, cultural, economic and biological

transformations that mark them as posthumans.

But I am getting ahead of my story, so let us

return to the essays title for further explication. The

double slash refers in part to the punctuation mark

Suddenly cars have increased mobility, able to travel

stations will be on their route; cars proliferate
because they are now much more useful; and traffic

explodes exponentially. The double slash references

the analogous transformation in global communications
and all the pervasive changes it has wrought.

What about the two terms the double slash
·7·
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connects and divides, “ writing” and “ posthuman” ?
Since I helped to initiate posthuman studies nearly
twenty years ago by publishing the first scholarly
monograph on the topic ( Hayles, How We Became
Posthuman ) , versions of the posthuman have
proliferated enormously. In my book, I argued that a
series of information technologies, including cybernetics, artificial intelligence, robotics, artificial life
and virtual reality successively undercut traditional
assumptions about the liberal humanist subject,
breaking open the constellation of traits traditionally
considered to constitute human beings and laying the
groundwork for new visions to emerge. Evaluating
these new configurations, I urged resistance to those
that supposed the biological body could or should be
abandoned, allowing humans to achieve immortality
by uploading consciousness into a computer. The
theoretical underpinning for this power fantasy was
(and is ) a view of information as a disembodied
entity that can flow effortlessly between different
substrates. Consequently, part of the theoretical

challenge that the posthuman poses is to develop
different theories of information that connect it with
embodiment, context, and hence to meaning.

1. Why Posthumanism / / Why Now?
Two decades later, cultural and theoretical
trends have led posthuman studies in diverse
directions. Particularly noteworthy is the plethora of
approaches that see positive roles for the posthuman
as antidotes to the imperialistic, rationalistic, and
anthropocentric versions of the human that emerged
in the Enlightenment. Although a full analysis of
these trends is beyond this essays scope, contemporary versions of the posthuman can be roughly divided between those that see technological innovations
as central, and others that focus on different kinds of
forces, structures, and environments to posit the

posthuman subject. The catalysts for these versions
are diverse, ranging from the huge influence of
Gilles Deleuzes philosophy, to arguments that challenge the anthropocentric privileging of humans over
nonhumans and see the posthuman as a way to a·8·

chieve this, to a growing sense of crisis over the human impact on earth systems and a corresponding
desire to re-envision the human in posthuman terms.
Of course, these categories are far from airtight, and
many positions incorporate elements of several
different trends. Nevertheless, the centrality of
technology, or lack of it, provides a useful way to
group these different versions and locate my own
position in relation to them.
On the non-technological side is the “ sustainable subject ” envisioned by Rose Braidotti
( Braidotti, “ The Ethics ” ; The Posthuman ) .
Influenced by Deleuze, Braidotti departs from his
philosophy by wanting to salvage a coherent
subjectivity, albeit in modified form as an entity
open to desires, intensities and lines of flight that
Deleuze evokes as he and his co-author Guattari
write against the subject, the sign, and the
organism. Braidotti urges her readers to become
subjects open to flows so intense that they are
almost — but not quite — taken to the breaking
point, “ cracking, but holding it, still ” ( “ The
Ethics” 139 ) even as the currents rip away most
conventional assumptions about what constitutes the
human subject.
Also on this side is Cary Wolfes proposal for
posthumanism, which he identifies with his original
synthesis between Luhmannian systems theory and
Derridean deconstruction. Like Braidotti, Wolfes
version of posthumanism is virtually devoid of
technological influence. The central dynamic, as he
sees it, is a recursive doubling back of a system on
itself, in response to and defense against the alwaysgreater complexity of the surrounding environment.
This structural dynamic is essentially transhistorical,
demonstrating only a weak version of historical
contingency through secondary mechanisms that
emerge as the system differentiates into different
subsystems as a way to increase its internal

complexity. He defines posthumanism in a way that
excludes most if not all technological posthumanisms,
a breathtakingly arrogant move that does not, of
course, keep those who want to include technology
from also claiming title to the posthuman.
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At the other end of the spectrum are visions of
the posthuman that depend almost entirely on future
technological advances. Nick Bostrom (2014) speculates on how humans may transform themselves, for
example through whole brain emulation, an updated
version of the uploading scenario. This not-yetexisting technology would use scanning techniques to
create a three-dimensional map of neuronal
networks, which would then be uploaded to a
computer to re-create the brains functional and
dynamic capacities. In other scenarios, he imagines
using genetic engineering such as CRISPR gene
editing to go beyond present-day capabilities of
targeting gene-specific diseases such as Huntingtons
and leap forward to techniques that address wholegenomic complex traits such as cognitive and
behavioral capabilities (45 ) . This could be done,
he suggests, by creating multiple embryos and
choosing the one with the most desirable genetic
characteristics. In an even creepier version of future
eugenic interventions, he discusses iterated genome
selection, in which gametes are developed from
embryonic stem cells, and then that generation is
used to develop more gametes, each time selecting
the most genetically desirable embryos, thus
compressing multiple generations of selection into a
single maturation period. Whereas theorists like
Braidotti and Wolfe are primarily concerned with
ethical and cultural issues, for Bostrom the main
focus is on technological possibilities. As the above
scenarios suggest, he gives minimal consideration to
the ethics of posthuman transformations and its
cultural implications.
Also on this end of the spectrum is philosopher
David Roden ( 2014 ) , who asks under what
conditions posthuman life ( either biological or
computational) might be developed, and what the
relation of such life would be to humans. He
assumes that to count as posthuman, an entity must

intelligence and capabilities to their own powers. He
concludes, unsurprisingly given his premises, that
humans will be unable to control the direction or
activities of posthuman life and that it is entirely
possible such emergence will mark the end of the
human species. While Roden is deeply concerned
with ethical issues, he resolutely refuses an
anthropocentric perspective and judges posthuman
life on its own merits rather than from a human
viewpoint ( although one may question how this is
possible) . His version of the posthuman finds many
reflections in contemporary novels and films, with
the difference that he refuses to speculate on what
form posthuman life might take. He argues that a
rigorous philosophical evaluation requires that the
future be left entirely open-ended, since we cannot
know what will arise and any prediction we might
make could be wildly off the mark. His stance
recalls Yogi Berras quip, “ Its tough to make
predictions, especially about the future. ”
The problem with all these versions of the
posthuman, as I see it, is that they either refuse the
influence of technology altogether or else rely on
future technologies that do not yet exist. While
speculation about an unknown future may have some
usefulness, in that it stimulates us to think about
present choices, Rodens carful avoidance of
predictions about the forms posthuman life might
take means that his analysis is significantly
circumscribed in scope. By contrast, my approach is
to find a middle way that acknowledges the seminal
role computational media play in transforming how
we think of human beings, and yet remains grounded
in already-existing technologies widely acknowledged
to have immensely influenced present societies.
Why should we regard technology as central to
the posthuman? While it is possible to suppose that
notions of posthumanism may have arisen earlier,
say before 1950 when computation really took off, I

humans invent a life form vastly superior in

made the idea of a historical rupture not only

be radically different from humans as we know them,
having emerged as a result of what science fiction
writer Vernon Vinge calls the “ singularity” ( Vinge,
“ The Coming ” ) , the historical moment when

think such ideas would have remained esoteric and
confined to small elites ( Nietzsches “ übermensch”
is one such example) . Posthumanism only became a
central cultural concern when everyday experiences
·9·
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convincing but obvious, providing the impetus to
think of the “ human” as something that had become
“ post. ” Computational media have now permeated
virtually every aspect of modern technologies,
including automobiles, robotic factories, electrical
grids, defense systems, communication satellites,
and so forth. Their catalyzing and pervasive effects
have in my view played a pivotal role in ushering in
the “ posthuman,” with all of its complexities and
diverse articulations.
My own version has been called as “ critical
posthumanism” (Roden 44 45) and “ technological
posthumanism” (Cecchetto 63 92). I note that both
of these categories tend to elide the differences
between my views and those who espouse
transhumanism. From my perspective this difference
is important, because transhumanism usually implies
that humans should seek to transform their biological
and cognitive limits, whereas I am much more
interested in conditions that already exist and the
ways in which they are transforming how “ the
human ” is performed and conceptualized. My
writing is directed not to the future or the past but
the complexities of the hybrid human-technical
systems that constitute the infrastructural necessities
of contemporary life.
With its sense of marking some kind of rupture
in the human, the posthuman offers opportunities to
re-think humans in relation to their built world and
to the planetary ecologies in which all worlds,
human and nonhuman, are immersed. My
contribution toward this effort is articulated in my
book Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive
Nonconscious. Drawing on recent work in
neuroscience, cognitive science and other fields, I
develop the idea of the cognitive nonconscious, a
mode of neuronal processing inaccessible to
consciousness but nevertheless performing functions
essential for consciousness to operate. This research

and organisms that do not possess consciousness or
even central nervous systems, such as plants. It
encourages us to build bridges between the
cognitions immanent in all biological lifeforms and
technical cognitive media such as computers. The
result, I argue, is a framework in which the
anthropocentric emphasis on human consciousness is
decentered and located within a much deeper,
richer, and broader cognitive ecology encompassing
the planet. This is the context in which we should
understand the pervasiveness and importance to the
posthuman of hybrid human-technical systems,
which I call cognitive assemblages.
Cognitive assemblages are tighter or looser
collections of technical objects and human
participants through which cognitions circulate in the
form of information, interpretations, and meanings.
My use of assemblage overlaps with that of Deleuze
and Guattari ( A Thousand Plateaus; see also
DeLanda, Assemblage Theory) , although it has some
differences as well. Since Deleuze and Guattari want
to deconstruct the idea of pre-existing entities, the
assemblage in their view is a constantly mutating
collection of ongoing deterritorializations and
reterritorializations, subverting the formation of
stable identities. By contrast, my idea of cognitive
assemblages is entirely consistent with pre-existing
entities such as humans and technical systems. My
framework also overlaps with Bruno Latours ActorNetwork-Theory ( Latour, Reassembling the Social) ,
but whereas Latour places humans and material
forces on the same plane, my emphasis on cognition
draws an important distinction between cognitive
entities on the one hand and material forces such as
tornadoes, hurricanes and tsunamis on the other.
The crucial distinguishing features, I argue, are
choice and interpretation, activities that all
biological lifeforms perform but that material forces
do not. Choice and interpretation are also intrinsic to

a comparison between human nonconscious cognition

What is cognition, in my view? I define it as

invites a reassessment of the role of consciousness in
human life in ways that open out onto a much
broader sense of cognition that extends beyond the
brain into the body and environment. It also enables
·10·

the design of computational media, where choice ( or
selection) is understood as the interpretation of
information rather than anything having to do with
free will.
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“ the process of interpreting information in contexts
that connect it with meaning. ” Although space will
not allow me to fully parse this definition here,
suffice it to say that I see cognition as a process, not
an entity, and moreover as taking place in specific
contexts, which strongly connects it with
embodiment for biological lifeforms and particular
instantiations for computational media. This
definition sets a low bar for something to count as
cognitive; in Unthought, I argue that all lifeforms
have some cognitive capabilities, even plants.
Choice ( or selection ) enters in because it is
necessary for interpretation to operate; if there is
only one possible selection, any opening for
interpretation is automatically foreclosed. The
definition hints at a view of meaning very different
from the anthropocentric sense it traditionally has as
hermeneutic activities performed by humans. Rather, meaning here is oriented toward a pragmatist
sense of the consequences of actions, a perspective
that applies to cognitive technologies as well as lifeforms and leads to the claim that computers can also
generate, interpret, and understanding meanings.

Let us turn now to the other term in my title,
“ writing,” and consider the complex ways it relates
to “ posthuman. ” I wrote my dissertation on a
manual typewriter, and lurking somewhere within my
synapses is the muscle memory of that activity,
including how much key pressure is necessary to
make the ink impression on paper dark enough but
not so sharp as to tear the paper, and how fast the
keys can be hit without having them jam together.
There was no mystery about this process; everything
was plain and open to view, from the mechanical
key linkages to the inked ribbon snaking through the
little prongs that held it into place above the paper.

through a complex series of layers of interacting
codes, starting at the most basic level with circuits
and logic gates, which in turn interact with
microcode ( hardwired or floating) , up to machine
code and the instruction set architecture for the
machine, which interacts with the system software or
operating system, which in turns interfaces with
assembly language, on up to high-level languages
such as C + + , Java and Python, and finally to
executable programs such as Microsoft Word. As I
write, multiple operations within these levels of code
are running to check my spelling, grammar, and
sentence structures. In a very real sense, even when
I compose alone in a room, I have a whole series of
machinic collaborators. If I go online to check
definitions, references, and concepts, the circle of
collaborators expands exponentially, including
humans who contribute to such sites as Wikipedia,
computers that generate the code necessary for my
queries to travel through cyberspace, and network
infrastructures that carry the packets along internet
routes.
The mere act of composing anything on a
computer enrolls me in cognitive assemblages of
fluctuating composition as I invoke various
functionalities, programs, and affordances. In this
sense my digital writing is always already
posthuman. When I write about posthumanism, the
condition becomes conceptual as well as
technological, for I am immersed in the very
environments that I wish to analyze, a systemic
recursivity that, as we have seen, is characteristic of
some versions of posthumanism. This is another
meaning of my titles double slash, connoting by its
repetitive mark the folding back of writing about
posthumanism into the posthuman condition of
technical / / human cognitions circulating within
cognitive assemblages.
Among the theorists interrogating this

surface inscription I see on the screen is generated

contrast, digital texts change dynamically to suit

2. Writing Posthuman / / Posthuman Writing

Nowadays, other than scribbled grocery lists and
greeting card notes, I write entirely on a computer,
as do most people in developed countries.
Here, by contrast, mystery abounds. The

posthuman condition is Dennis Tenen in Plain Text:
The Poetics of Computation ( 2017 ) . “ Extant
theories of interpretation,” he writes, “ evolved
under conditions tied to static print media. By
·11·
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their readers, political contexts, and geographies. . .
I advocate for the development of computational
poetics, a strategy of interpretation capable of
reaching past surface content to reveal platforms and
infrastructures that stage the construction of
meaning” (6) . He contrasts pen and paper ( and I
might add to this my un-mysterious mechanical
typewriter) with digital writing, where “ the bridge
between keyboard and screen passes through
multiple mediating filters. Writing itself becomes a
programmed experience” (14) . He refers to digital
writing as a “ textual laminate,” emphasizing ( by
analogy with laminated products such as plywood )
the multiple layers of code that comprise it. When
printed out, the textual laminate is flattened to a
two-dimensional sheet, but when computer processes
are running, it is a multidimensional network of
interactions stretching across the globe.
Motivating Tenens concern with digital writing
are the “ new forms of technological control ” ( 3 )
embedded in the layers of machinic code, including
copyright restrictions that prohibit the user from
accessing the deeper layers of proprietary code,
much less intervening in them. Therefore, he argues
that to “ speak truth to power — to retain a civic
potential for critique — we must therefore perceive
the mechanisms of its codification. Critical theory
cannot otherwise endure apart from material contexts
of textual production, which today emanate from the
fields of computer science and software engineering”
( 3 ) . Moreover, in cases where using specific
software packages such as Adobe Acrobat require
assent to conditions of use that he regards as
unacceptable, he advocates boycotting them
altogether in favor of “ plain text,” text written with
a simple editing program as Textedit that uses
minimal coding instructions. By contrast, with pdfs
“ the simple act of taking notes becomes a paid
feature of the Adobe Acrobat software. What was
gained in a minor [. . . ] convenience of formatting is
lost in a major concession to the privatization of
public knowledge” (194) .
This aspect of his project strikes me as
analogous to Thoreaus attempt at Walden to leave
·12·

civilization behind and live in a “ purer ” state of
nature, uncontaminated by then-contemporary
amenities ( Thoreau, Walden ). This approach
reasons that if technological control is a problem,
then retreat to practices that abjure it as much as
possible. To his credit, Tenen recognizes that such a
stance risks inconsistency, because while one can avoid using pdfs ( with some effort and inconvenience), one can scarcely make the same kind of decisions regarding, say, water purification plants, the
electrical grid, and modern transportation networks
and still participate in the contemporary world. Tenen
defends his argument that we must understand the
laminate text, including even the quantum physics
entailed in a computers electronics, with the
following reasoning. “ Why insist on physics when it
comes to computers,” he asks rhetorically, when one
might drive a car without insisting on knowing exactly
how all its components work? He answers,
“Computers [. . . ] are dissimilar to cars in that they
are epistemic, not just purely instrumental, artifacts.
They do not just get us from point A to point B; they
augment thought itself, therefore transforming what it
means to be human” (51) .
While I wholeheartedly agree with his
conclusion that computers are epistemic, I am less
sure of his assertion about cars, which in their
ability to transport us rapidly from one environment
to another might also be considered epistemic, in
that they alter the world horizons within which we
live. The better argument, I think, is to say that
Tenen is especially concerned with computers
because he writes for a living, and hence writing to
him is more than instrumental: it is a way of life and
a crucial component of how he knows the world and
conveys his thoughts to others.
His approach, therefore, has special relevance
to literary theory and criticism. One of his central
claims is that the underlying layers of code “ affect
all higher-level interpretive activity” ( 2 ) , so that
literary analysis can no longer remain content with
reading surface inscriptions but must plunge into the
code layers to discern what operations are occurring

there. This concern is reflected within the emerging
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field of electronic literature in a rich diversity of
ways. Here I should clarify that whereas all writing
on a computer is necessarily digital, “ electronic
literature” refers specifically to digital writing that
can lay claim to the affordances and resources of
literary texts and literature in general. ②
An analogy with artists book may be helpful
here. Johanna Drucker, in her definitive book on
twentieth-century artists books ( Drucker, The
Century of Artistss Books) , suggests that the special
characteristic of artists books that distinguish them
from books in general is their mission to interrogate
the book as an artistic form. What makes a book,
and how far can boundaries be stretched and have
the object still recognized as “ book” ? What about
booksized marble slab covers incised with letters and
no pages, or a book with many different kinds of paper but no ink ( Hayles, Writing Machines 74 ) ?
Such projects draw our attention to our presuppositions about what a book is and thereby invite meditations on how we think about bookishness.
Similarly, electronic literature asks how far the
boundaries of the “ literary ” may be stretched and
still have the work perform as literature, for example
in works where words are fused with, and sometimes
replaced by, animations, images, sounds, and
gestures. How do our ideas about literature change
when the text becomes interactive, mutable,
intermedial, and transformable by human actions,
including even breathing ( see for example Kate
Pullingers iPhone story, “ Breathe,” 2018 ) . These
questions imply that electronic literature is a special
form of digital writing that interrogates the status of
writing in the digital age by using the resources of
literature, even as it also brings into question what
literature is and can be.

3. Post / / Code / / Human
To see how works of electronic literature
encourage users to plunge into the underlying code,
I turn to Sea and Spar Between, a collaborative work

authored by Nick Montfort, a Ph. D. in computer
science who also creates works of generative poetry,
and Stephanie Strickland, a prize-winning poet who
works in both print and electronic media. The
authors chose passages from Melvilles Moby-Dick to
combine with Emily Dickinsons poems; the
programs code combines fragments from the two
sources together to create quatrains composed of two
couplets, including juxtaposing Melville and
Dickinsons words and even creating compound
neologisms with one syllable from Dickinson and the
other from Melville. The output is algorithmically
determined, although of course the human authors
devised the code and constructed the database from
which the algorithms draw for their recombinations.
The screenic display is a light blue canvas on which
the quatrains appear in a darker blue, color tones
that metaphorically evoke the ocean with the couplets
performing as “ fish. ”
Locations are defined through “ latitude ” and
“ longitude ” coordinates, both with 14992383
positions, resulting in about 225 trillion stanzas,
roughly the amount, the authors estimate, of fish in
the sea. As Stuart Moulthrop points out ( Moulthrop
and Grigar 35 ) , the numbers are staggering and
indicate that the words displayed on a screen, even
when set to the farthest zoom-out setting, are only a
small portion of the entire conceptual canvas.
The feeling of being “ lost at sea ” is
accentuated by the works extreme sensitivity to
cursor movements, resulting in a highly “ jittery ”
feel, suggestive of a fishs rapid and erratic flashings
as it swims. It is possible to locate oneself in this sea
of words by entering a latitude / longitude position
provided in a box at screen bottom. This move will
result in the same set of words appearing on screen

as were previously displayed at that position.
Conceptually, then, the canvas pre-exists in its
entirety, even though in practice, the very small
portion displayed on the screen at a given time is

computed “ on the fly,” because to keep this
enormous canvas in computer memory all at once
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Figure 1. Screen shot of Sea and Spar Between, at closest zoom. Image courtesy of Stephanie Strickland,
used with permission.

would be prohibitively memory-intensive, far
exceeding even contemporary processing and storage
limits.
The effect is a kind of technological sublime, as
the authors note in one of their comments when they
remark that the work signals “ an abundance
exceeding normal, human scale combined with a
dizzying difficulty of orientation. ” The authors
reinforce the idea of a reader lost at sea in their essay
on this work, “ Spars of Language Lost at Sea ”
( Montfort and Strickland 2013) . They point out that
randomness does not enter into the work until the
reader opens it and begins to read. “ It is the reader
of Sea and Spar Between who is deposited randomly
in an ocean of stanza each time she returns to the
poem. It is you, reader, who are random” (8) .
How does the work invite the reader to plunge
into the underlying code? The invitation takes the
form of an essay that the authors have embedded
within the source code, marked off by double slashes

( yet another connotation of my title ) , the
conventional coding mark used to indicate comments
( that is, non-executable statements) . The essay is
entitled “ cut to fit the toolspun course,” a phrase
generated by the program itself. The comments make
The essay-as-comment functions both to explain
·14·

clear that human judgments played a large role in
text selection, whereas computational power was
largely expended on creating the screen display:
/ / most of the code in Sea and Spar Between is
used to manage the
/ / interface and to draw the stanzas in the
browsers canvas region. Only
/ / 2609 bytes of the code ( about 22% ) are

actually used to combine text
/ / fragments and generate lines. The remaining
5654 bytes ( about 50% )
/ / deals with the display of the stanzas and with
interactivity.
By contrast, the selection of texts was an analog
procedure, intuitively guided by the authors
aesthetic and literary sensibilities.
/ / The human / analog element involved jointly
selecting small samples of
/ / words from the authors lexicons and
inventing a few ways of generating
/ / lines. We did this not quantitatively, but
based on our long acquaintance
/ / with the distinguishing textual rhythms and
rhetorical gestures of Melville
/ / and Dickinson.
the operation of specific sections of the code and also
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Figure 2. Screen shot of Sea and Spar Between, taken at medium zoom. Image courtesy of
Stephanie Strickland, used with permission.

Figure 3. Screen shot of Sea and Spar Between, farthest out zoom. Image courtesy of Stephanie
Strickland, used with permission.

provides a commentary on the project itself,

knows how to count syllables and what parts of words

comments, plus the code they explicate, make clear

authors comment, how “ to generate each type of

The computer knows the display parameters, how to

the browser, and handle input and other events. ”

dimensional surface, and how to center a users

received and it knows what to do in response to a

functioning in this role as literary criticism. The
the extent of the computers role as a collaborator.

draw the canvas, how to locate points on this two-

request for a given latitude and longitude. It also

can combine to form compound words. It knows, the

line, assemble stanzas, draw the lattice of stanzas in
That is, it knows when input from the user has been

given input. What it does not know, of course, are
·15·
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the semantic meanings of the words and the literary
allusions and connotations evoked by specific
combinations of phrases and words.
In reflecting on the larger significance of this
collaboration, the (human) authors outline what they
see as the users involvement as responder and critic.
/ / Our final claim: the most useful critique
/ / is a new constitution of elements. On one
level, a reconfiguration of a
/ / source code file to add comments — by the
original creator or by a critic —
/ / accomplishes this task. But in another, and
likely more novel, way,
/ / computational poetics and the code developed
out of its practice
/ / produce a widely distributed new constitution.
To the extent that the “ new constitution” could not
be implemented without the computers knowledge,
intentions and beliefs, the computer becomes not
merely a device to display the results of human
creativity but a collaborator in the project. By
enticing the user / reader to examine the source code,
the authors make clear the nature of the literary text
as a cognitive assemblage performed by a humantechnical complex system. By implication, it also
evokes the existence of another cognitive assemblage
activated when a reader opens the work on her
computer and begins to play the work.

4. Evolving / / Posthuman
Sea and Spar Between does not invoke any form
of artificial intelligence, and differs in this respect
from my next example, which does make such an
invocation. Montfort and Strickland make this
explicit in their comments:
/ / These rules [ governing how the stanzas are
created ] are simple; there is no elaborate
AI architecture
/ / or learned statistical process at work here.
By contrast Evolution, a collaborative work by
poet Johannes Heldén and Håkan Jonson, takes the
computers role one step further, from collaborator to
co-creator,
·16·

or

better

perhaps

poetic

rival,

programmed to erase and overwrite the words of the
Heldéns original. Heldén is a true polymath, not
only writing poetry but also creating visual art,
sculpture, and sound art. His books of poetry often
contain images, and his exhibitions showcase his
work in all these different media. Jonson, a
computer programmer by day, also creates visual and
sound art, and their collaboration on Evolution
reflects the authors multiple talents. The authors
write in a preface that the “ ultimate goal ” of
Evolution is to pass “ ‘ The Imitation Game ’ as
proposed by Alan Turing in 1951 [ . . . ] when new
poetry that resembles the work of the original author
is created or presented through an algorithm, is it
possible to make the distinction between ‘ author ’
and ‘ programmer’ ?” ( Evolution 2013) .
These questions, ontological as well as
conceptual, are better understood when framed by
the actual workings of the program. In the 2013
version, the authors input into a database all ten of
the then-extant print books of Héldens poetry. A
stochastic model of this textual corpus was created
using a statistical model known as a Markov Chain
( and the corresponding Markov Decision Process) ,
a discrete state process that moves randomly stepwise through the data, with each next step depending
only on the present and not on any previous states.
This was coupled with genetic algorithms that
work on an evolutionary model. At each generation, a
family of algorithms (“ children ” of the previous
generation ) is created by introducing variations
through a random “seed. ”Randomness is necessary to
create the variations upon which selection can work.
All the children in a given generation bear a
Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” to one another,
having the same basic structure but with minor
variations.
This generation of algorithms is then
evaluated according to some fitness criteria, and one
is selected as the most “fit. ” In this case, the fitness
criteria are based on elements of Heldéns style; the
idea is to select the “ child” algorithm whose output
most closely matches Heldéns own poetic practices.
Then this algorithms output is used to modify the
text, either replacing a word ( or words) or changing
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how a block of white space functions, for example,
putting a word where there was white space originally
( all the white spaces, coded as individual “ letters”
through their spatial coordinates on the page, are
represented in the database as signifying elements, a
data representation of Heldens practice of using white
spaces as part of his poetic lexicon).
The interface presents as a opened book, with
light grey background and black font. On the left
side is a choice between English and Swedish and a
slider controlling how fast the text will evolve. On
the right side is the text, with words and white

spaces arranged as if on a print page. As the user
watches, the text changes and evolves; a small white
rectangle flashes to indicate spaces undergoing
mutation ( which might otherwise be invisible if
replaced by another space) . Each time the program
is opened, one of Heldéns poems is randomly
chosen as a starting point, and the display begins
after a few hundred iterations have already happened
(the authors thought this would be more interesting
than starting at the beginning). At the bottom of the
“ page ” the number of the generation is displayed
(starting from zero, disregarding previous iterations).

Figure 4. Screen shot of Evolution, generation 18.

Figure 5. Screen shot of same run-through of Evolution, generation 40.

·17·

文艺理论研究 2018 年第 3 期

Also displayed is the dataset used to construct
the random seed. The dataset changes with each
generation, and a total of eighteen different datasets
are used, ranging from “ mass of exoplanetary
systems detected by imaging,” to “ GISS surface
temperature” for a specific latitude / longitude and
range of dates, to “ cups of coffee per episode of
Twin Peaks ” ( Evolution [ print book ] , n. p. )
These playful selections mix cultural artifacts with
with
terrestrial
environmental
parameters
astronomical data, suggesting that the evolutionary
process can be located within widely varying
contexts. The works audio, experienced as a
continuous and slightly varying drone, is generated
in real time from sound pieces that Heldén previously
composed. From this dataset, one-minute audio
chunks are randomly selected and mixed in using
cross-fade, which creates an ambient soundtrack
unique for each view ( “ The Algorithm,” Evolution
[ print book] , n. p. ) .
The text will continue to evolve as long as the
user keeps the screen open, with no necessary end
point or teleology, only the continuing replacement
of Heldéns words with those of the algorithm. One
could theoretically reach a point where all of
Heldéns original words have been replaced, in
which case the program would continue to evolve its
own constructions in exactly the same way as it had
operated on Heldéns words / spaces.
In addition to being available online, the work
is also represented by a limited edition print book
( Evolution [ print book ] 2014 ) , in which all the
code is printed out. In this sense, the book performs
in a print medium the same gambit we saw in Sea
and Spar Between, mixing interpretative essays of
literary criticism together with algorithms so that the
reader is constantly plunged into the code, even if
her intent is simply to read about the work rather
than reading the work itself. Moreover, the essays
appear on white pages with black ink, whereas the
code is displayed on black pages with white ink. The
inverse color scheme functions as a material
metaphor ( a physical artifact whose properties have
metaphor resonance; see Hayles, 2002 22 ) that
suggests the Janus-like nature of digital writing, in
·18·

which one side faces the human and the other, the
machine.
The essays, labeled as appendices but placed
toward the books beginning and interspersed with the
code sections most germane to how the program
works, are brief commentaries by well-known critics
of electronic literature, including John Cayley,
Maria Engberg, and Jesper Olsson. Cayley
( Evolution [ print book ] , 2014, n. p. ) , as if
infected by the works aesthetic, adopts a style that
evolves through restatements with slight variations,
thus performing as well as describing his interactions
with the work. In Appendix 2: “ Breath,” he
suggests the work is “ an extension of his [ Heldéns]
field of poetic life, his articulated breath, manifest
as graphically represented linguistic idealities,
fragments from poetic compositions, I assume, that
were previously composed by privileged human
processes proceeding through the mind and body of
Heldén and passing out of him in a practice of
writing [ . . . ] I might be concerned, troubled
because I am troubled philosophically by the ontology
[ . . . ] the problematic being [ . . . ] of linguistic
artifacts that are generated by compositional process
such that they may never actually be — or never be
able to be [ . . . ] read by any human having the
mind and body to read them. ” “ Mind and body ”
repeats,
as
do
“ composed / composition,”
“ troubled,” and “ never actually be / never be
able,” ( ibid. ) but each time in a new context that
slightly alters the meaning. When Cayley speaks of
being “ troubled,” he refers to one of the crucial
differences in embodiment between human and
machine: whereas the human needs to sleep, eat,
visit the bathroom, the machine can continue
indefinitely, not having the same kind of “ mind and
body” as human writers or readers. The sense of
excess, of exponentially larger processes than human
minds and bodies can contain, recalls the excess of
Sea and Spar Between and gestures toward the new
scales possible when computational media become
co-creators.
Maria Engberg, in “ Appendix 3: Chance
Operations” ( Evolution [ print book] , 2014, n. p. )
2014 ) parallels Evolution to the John Cages
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aesthetic, as indicated by her title citing Cages
famous name for his randomizing algorithms. She
quotes from another essay by Cayley ( not in this
volume) in which he calls for an emphasis on
process over object. “ ‘ What if we shift our attention
decidedly to practices, processes, procedures —
towards ways of writing and reading rather than
dwelling on either textual artifacts themselves ( even
time-based literary objects ) or the concept
underpinning objects-as-artifacts?’ ” In Evolution,
the code underlying the screenic artifact is itself a
series of endless processes, displacing, mutating,
evolving, so the distinction between artifact and
process becomes blurred, if not altogether
deconstructed.
Jesper Olsson, in “ Appendix 4: We Have to
Trust the Machine” ( Evolution [ print book] , 2014,
n. p. ) also sees an analogy in Cages work,
commenting that the work “ was not the poet
expressing himself. He was at best a medium for
something else. ” This “ something else” is of course
the machinic intelligence struggling to enact
evolutionary processes so that it can write like
Heldén, albeit without the “ mind and body ” that
produced the poetry in the first place. A disturbing
analogy comes to mind: H. G. Wells The Island of
Doctor Moreau and the half-human beasts who keep
asking, “ Are we not men?” In the contemporary
world, the porous borderline is not between human /
animal but human / machine. Olsson sees “ this way
of setting up rules, coding writing programs” as “ an
attempt to align the subject with the world, to
negotiate the differences and similarities between
ourselves and the objects with which we co-exist. ”
( ibid. )
As I have argued here and elsewhere, machine
intelligence has so completely penetrated complex
human systems that it has become our
“natureculture,” Jonas Ingvarssons neologism (  la
Latour) to describe our contemporary condition. He
points to this conclusion when he writes in Appendix
5, “ The Within of Things” ( Evolution [ print book]
2014, n. p. ) , that the “ signs are all over Heldéns
poetic and artistic output. Computer supported lyrics
about nature and environments, graphics and audio

paint urbannatural land-and-soundscapes [ . . . ] We
witness the ( always already ongoing ) merge of
artificial and biological consciousness ” ( Appendix
5, “ The Within of Things” ) . Although he does not
use the phrase, the sensibility he describes fits
precisely the posthuman condition.
How does Heldén feel about his dis / re /
placement by machinic intelligence? I had an
opportunity to ask him when ( with Danuta
Fjellestad ) I met Heldén, Jonson, and Jesper
Olsson at a Stockholm restaurant for dinner and a
demonstration of Evolution ( private communication,
March 16, 2018 ) . In a comment reminiscent of
Cage, Heldén remarked that he felt “ relieved,” as if
a burden of subjectivity had been lifted from his
shoulders. He recounted starting Evolution and
watching it for a long time. At first he amused
himself by thinking “ me” or “ not me” as new words
appeared on screen. Soon, however, he came to feel
that this was not the most interesting distinction he
could make; rather, he began to see that when the
program was “ working at its best,” its processes
created new ideas, conjunctions, and insights that
would not have occurred to him ( this is, of course,
from a human point of view, since the machine has
no way to assess its productions as insights or ideas,
only as more or less fit according to criteria based on
Heldéns style ) . That this fusion of human and
machine intelligence could produce something better
than either operating alone, he commented, made
him feel “ joyous,” as if he had helped to bring
something new into the world based on his own
artistic and poetic creations but also at times
exceeding them.
He remarked that after he and Jonson had
created Evolution, he found his own poetic practice
mutating in response to what he had seen the
program produce. In this sense Evolution reveals the
power of literature conceived as a cognitive
assemblage, in which cognitions are distributed
between human and technical actors, with
information, interpretations and meanings circulating
throughout the assemblage in all directions.
Articulations first flow from human brains and bodies
into machines, then back again from machines to
·19·
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humans, in a recursive system of circular causality
that has profoundly changed how we think of “ the
human. ”

5. Literature / / Cognitive Assemblage
At this point we would do well to recall Tenens
caution that “ when we mistake things for animate
actors, we further diminish our capacity for critical
analysis and collective action ” ( Tenen 11 ) . In
several places, Heldén and Jonson describe
Evolution as powered by artificial intelligence, which
would introduce agential capacity at a high level. A
skeptic might respond that genetic algorithms are not
intelligent at all; they know nothing about the
semantics of the work and operate through
procedures that are in principle relatively simple
( acknowledging that the ways random “ seeds” are
used and fitness criteria are developed and applied in
this work are far from simple, not to mention the
code generating the presentation layers) . The power
of genetic algorithms derives from finding ways to
incorporate evolutionary dynamics within an artificial
medium, but like many evolutionary processes, they
are not smart in themselves, any more than are the
evolutionary strategies that animals with tiny brains
like fruit flies, or no brain at all like nematode
worms, have developed through natural selection.
When I asked Jonson about this objection, he indicated that for him as a programmer, the important part
was the more accurate description of genetic algorithms as “ population-based meta-heuristic optimization algorithms” (“The Algorithm,” Evolution [print
book], n. p. ). Whether this counts as “ artificial
intelligence” he regarded as a trivial point.
His lack of concern with the works simulative
nature indicates a major difference between literary
culture as it has traditionally developed and the new
condition of the literary text as cognitive assemblage.
Long before the twentieth century, textual surfaces
achieved depth through hermeneutic interpretation;
since about 1980, the Jameson tradition of
symptomatic reading ( Jameson, The Political
Unconscious) has been a dominant trend in literary
criticism. Recent calls for “ surface reading ” by
·20·

Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus ( “ Surface,” 2009
1 21 ) have sought to call attention again to a
works aesthetic qualities, refusing the assumption
that the surface is an alibi for an ideological
substructure. With digital writing, however, another
kind of relationship emerges between surface and
depth, specifically the interplay between the screen
as the site of inscription and the code that generates
it. “ We can no longer use strategies of interpretation
at the level of ideology or representation alone,”
Tenen writes. “ The praxis of close reading must
reach down to the silicon bedrock: material entities,
and the physical structures that bear the weight of
interpretation” (12) .
While I am entirely sympathetic with this view,
I would add that the kind of close reading Tenen urges becomes even more powerful when contextualized
within larger cultural, social, economic and technological transformations that have catalyzed posthuman
studies. To grasp more fully the role of literature in
an era of digital writing, we must attend not only to
its thematic and aesthetic qualities but to the
computational media intrinsic to its production and
operation. Moreover, the humans who read digital
writing are themselves deeply influenced —
culturally, biologically, conceptually—by the
algorithmic culture that electronic literature critiques
even as it also performs it, in a reflexive doubling
connoted by the double slash connecting and dividing
the post / / human. Code / / comment, screen / /
algorithm, nature / / culture, culture / / technology,
human / / machine: these are the dualities, too often
posited as mutually exclusive binaries, that
increasingly interpenetrate in the cognitive
assemblages through which contemporary literary
texts are produced and disseminated, even when the

output form they take is a print book. When literary
texts take the specific form of electronic literature,
they both embody posthuman / / writing within
themselves and interrogate its conditions of
possibility, a recursive doubling always already
embedded in the double slash connecting / / dividing
the posthuman with the human-technical activity that
is writing in the digital era.
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